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Abstract:  This study addresses the relationship between religiosity and freedom of speech. 
While a growing body of research advances the now established notion that Islam as a religion in 
practice at the individual level is compatible with democracy, this work attempts a more nuanced 
analysis at the individual level concerning Muslim attitudes and views concerning the right of 
freedom of speech.  Findings obtained through bivariate comparisons of the Arab Barometer 
Wave I survey results of Morocco and Lebanon, show that religiosity does not predict antagonis-
tic views towards freedom of speech.  Findings support arguments that posit no relation between 
Islam as a religion or Muslim’s interpretation of Islam necessarily leading to anti-democratic or 
anti-freedom of speech sentiments.  This work also used bivariate comparisons to analyze the 
relationship between authoritarianism and freedom of speech.  As expected, authoritarian com-
parisons produced significant predictable statistical results.  Authoritarians in both countries, un-
surprisingly, were very supportive of their governments, and as a result, they were more com-
fortable with freedom of speech and open to diverse ideas in their countries than their non-au-
thoritarian counterparts.  In contrast, non-authoritarians were supportive of democracy and free-
dom of speech in theory, but were highly skeptical and even antagonistic to both, when applied 
to their countries’ political environment.  These seemingly contradictory results are mitigated 
when contextual factors are brought into focus.  Type of government and center of power were 
argued as the important potential contextual factors influencing these authoritarian results.  The 
major conclusions are: Individual religiosity is not a predictor of negative attitudes towards free-
dom of expression and authoritarianism seems to predict a more negative relationship with free-
dom of speech.  Additionally, when attempting to generalize statistical findings, one must take 
into account all contextual and environmental factors that affect the site of analysis. 
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I. Introduction 
 In 2005, the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoon depictions of 
Muhammed, the prophet of Islam, as a challenge to what those at the paper claimed were illegit-
imate religious demands.   Protesters from Muslim communities, both peaceful and violent, 1
voiced their displeasure for the depictions of Muhammed, an act some suggest is forbidden.   2
Whether it was a peaceful protest in Lebanon, the threat of ending diplomatic ties with Denmark 
by Libya and Saudi Arabia, or support for the printing of the images on freedom of speech 
grounds, the cartoons represent the complexities of freedom of expression and freedom of 
speech.   Muslim social integration, assimilation and acceptance in predominantly non-Muslim 3
countries, anger towards Western-friendly leaders in majority Muslim nations, have all been 
posited as explanations for the widespread anger.   Although pinpointing a single cause remains 4
impossible, these explanations are representative of the conflict regarding different understand-
ings: ideas and definitions of rights possessed by those supportive of democracy and democratic 
values.  Regardless of the freedom of speech issue, the publication and subsequent backlash ne-
cessitates further examination of the values of freedom of expression in the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA).  
!1
 Heiko Henkel,  “Fundamentally Danish? The Muhammad Cartoon Crisis as Transnational Drama,” Human Archi1 -
tecture: Journal of the Sociology of Self-Knowledge 8, no. 2 (2010): 67.
 “15,000 protest in London against cartoons,” Associated Press, The Guardian, February 18, 2006, www.the2 -
guardian.com/world/2006/feb/18/muhammadcartoons.  Lydia Polgreen, “Nigeria Counts 100 Deaths Over Danish 
Caricatures,” The New York Times, February 24, 2006.  Declan Walsh and John Aglionby, “Churches ablaze as 
protests continue across globe,” The Guardian, February 19, 2006, www.theguardian.com/world/2006/feb/20/pak-
istan.muhammadcartoons.
 “Freedom of speech” and “freedom of expression” are used interchangeably in this work.  While the author under3 -
stands the differences between two, those distinctions are not the focus of this work.  
 Henkel, 67-82.  Aamer Ahmed Khan, “Hidden Motives Behind Cartoon Protests,” BBC News, February 15, 2006 4
www.news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/4716762.stm.
 The Muhammad cartoons are not the only incident which could be related to Islam and 
freedom of speech.  Similar protests and anger erupted after the release of the 2012 movie trailer, 
Innocence of Muslims.  It is clear that the subject of freedom of speech will continue to be central 
as people and countries wrestle with competing ideas about basic human rights and values, and 
while the religious and the non-religious maintain somewhat competing views of what are the 
limits of freedom of speech and the acceptable role of religion.  Freedom of speech and religion 
is not the only topic of conversation concerning citizens of theMENA, but it is an extremely rel-
evant one as rapid democratic political change occurs throughout the region 
 The topic of freedom of expression in relation to the individual practice of Islam is not 
new or unique, but the outrage over the cartoon depictions of Muhammad may reveal the lack of 
understanding of how these concepts relate in some predominantly Muslim regions of the world.  
This work will examine several important questions regarding religion and wider democratic 
values.  Is religion the most important factor in understanding attitudes toward freedom of ex-
pression?  Is the outrage observed over the publication of the Muhammad cartoons really a func-
tion of religiosity?  Answering these questions will help in understanding the relationship be-
tween individual religiosity and freedom of speech.  Knowledge that will help ensure a more nu-
anced understanding of Muslims, which is why this work represents an important addition to the 
research as it concerns democratic attitudes of individual Muslims.  Rather than a function of re-
ligiosity, I show and argue that other factors, including authoritarianism, demographics and other 
contextual factors, influence attitudes towards freedom of speech more so than religiosity.  
 To understand religious individuals’ relationship with democracy, it is important to focus 
not on democracy as a system but democracy in practice.  While ideas about democracy vary, 
!2
basic civil and political rights are an essential part.  Such rights can include freedom of move-
ment, freedom of association, freedom of assembly and of course, freedom of religion.  While 
there has been a significant amount of research on the relationships between Islam in practice 
and democracy, there has been relatively little focus on attitudes towards freedom of speech and 
freedom of expression.  Which is why this analysis represents an important addition to the sub-
ject. 
II. Islam, Religiosity and Democracy in the MENA      
 While a handful of MENA countries have removed the yoke of dictatorship, the results 
have been disappointing.  The most recent Freedom House country ratings of the MENA do not 
reveal a compelling argument for the future of democracy in the region.  Of the twenty-one coun-
tries in the MENA comprising 350 million individuals, only one country, Israel, is considered 
free.   Except for intermittent years in Lebanon, all Arabic-speaking countries are considered 5
partly free or not free.  6
 For decades the MENA was exceptionally undemocratic, and authoritarian rule was the 
hallmark of the region.   A litany of reasons have been put forth to explain the failure to democ7 -
ratize, including the lack of perquisites to democracy (e.g., a market driven economy, adequate 
income and literacy levels, democratic neighbors, history of democracy), willing repressive ap-
!3
 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2013, Available online at: www.freedomhouse.org. 5
 Ibid.6
 Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," 7
Comparative Politics (2004): 139-157.
paratuses, culture, weakness of civil society, and of course, Islam.   Historically, Islam has been a 8
reoccurring explanation for persistent authoritarianism.   
 Islam as an abstract and ambiguous system of beliefs has been traditionally understood as 
antagonistic to democracy.   The argument is as follows: for Muslims, the past is ever-present 9
and more influential than any present conditions.  The character of predominantly Muslim soci-
eties is still guided by a remote and foundational historic period.   Muslims are viewed as mono10 -
lithic and unchanged from their past, a past that has defined them, without any possibility of 
change in their lives and society.   These explanations, however, have failed to see the obvious 11
transitions in Muslims societies.   Modern institutions such as nation states, modern bureaucra12 -
cies, political parties, elected parliaments, labor unions, corporations, associations, educational 
systems—as in most any advanced democratic nation—have formed throughout the MENA and 
other predominantly Muslim nations.   To suggest that predominantly Muslim cultures and soci13 -
eties remain essentially unchanged from their distant past is clearly not taking account of these 
developments.  In fact, these aforementioned institutional developments have a longer unbroken 
history of existence, than some  “modern” Western democratic nations.   Furthermore, as recent14 -
!4
 Bellin, 139-141. 8
 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs (1993): 22-49.9
 Abdou Filali-Ansary, “Muslims and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 (1999): 18, 19.  10
 Ibid., 19.11
 Ibid., 20-22.12
 This list is cited directly from Abdou Filali-Ansary’s, (1999), “Muslims and Democracy.”13
 Both Greece and Portugal, both of which have been under military rule as recent as the 1970s and both of which 14
have constitutions which are less than forty years old.
ly as the 1950s, Catholicism was considered incompatible with democracy, and yet this position 
appears rather foolish today.  15
Even what was conventionally thought a permanent feature of religious belief in the 
MENA, Islam’s antagonism towards democracy, or even a religious individuals’ negative rela-
tionship with freedom of speech, need not be permanent fixtures.   Generalizations such a these 16
appear unrelated to a number of recent findings that found few antagonistic results between Is-
lam practiced at the individual level, and democracy.  Recent research literature on the MENA 
reveals important conclusions concerning the influence of religion and religiosity.   17
Using survey data, scholars have developed a deeper understanding of democratic values 
and attitudes in the predominantly Muslim nations of the MENA.   In particular, the work of 18
Mark Tessler and coauthors have found that being Muslim does not necessarily impact political 
attitudes as what is claimed by some.   Those with the “strongest Islamic attachments” are not 19
automatically less supportive of democracy.   While some like Samuel Huntington (1993) and 20
Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom and Gizem Arikan (2012) have argued to the contrary, Tessler’s work sug-
!5
 Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitima15 -
cy,” American Political Science Review 53, no. 1 (1959): 92, 93.  It is important to note that this work is in no way 
claiming Catholicism and Islam are the same.  This comment is made within the context that views about major 
world religions change.
 Bernard Lewis,  "The Roots of Muslim Rage,” The Atlantic Monthly 266, no. 3 (1990): 47-60.16
 Tessler, Mark, "Do Islamic Orientations Influence Attitudes Toward Democracy in the Arab World? Evidence 17
from Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Algeria,” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 43 no. 3-5 (2002): 339.  
 For general world data, see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart’s, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics, 18
(Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 149.  And see Tim Niblock’s, “Democratization: 
A Theoretical and Practical Debate,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 25 no. 2 (1999): 221-233.  
 Tessler (2002).  And, Mark A. Tessler, and Eleanor Gao, "Gauging Arab Support for Democracy,” Journal of 19
Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 83-97.  And, Amaney A. Jamal, and Mark A. Tessler,"Attitudes in the Arab world,” 
Journal of Democracy 19, no. 1 (2008): 97-110.
 Tessler, (2002), 349.  20
gests that Islam should not necessarily be singled-out in an analysis of the region.  His work has 
found no empirical relationship between Islamic attachments and attitudes towards democracy.  21
 In addition to being no more or less in favor of democracy, being strongly religious and 
Muslim is not a predictor of wide variance as it relates to civic values.  Data shows those favor-
ing democratic systems both Islamic and secular, are no more likely to be a religious Muslim or 
secular individual.  Predispositions of both the religious Muslim and the secular individual (will-
ingness to be politically active, adherence to self-expressive values like personal trust, and toler-
ance) are overwhelmingly similar.   22
 Responses reveal encouraging findings regarding democratic political culture in the 
MENA.  Respondents were supportive of gender equality (except in relationship to women as 
leaders), are religiously tolerant, and believe respect for diversity of ideas is an important charac-
teristic of an elected leader.   While these are hopeful results, low levels of interpersonal trust 23
and civic participation and only a “moderate level of political interest and knowledge” hamper 
democratic growth.   Furthermore, a near consensus of people believes Islam and democracy to 24
be compatible.    25
As an aside, something rarely mentioned is that religiosity can represent a “positive” ef-
fect on “civic skills, leading individuals to actively engage in politics and hold more positive atti-
!6
 Huntington, 22-49.  And, Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom and Gizem Arikan, “A Two-edged Sword: The Differential Effect 21
of Religious Belief and Religious Social Context on Attitudes towards Democracy,” Political Behavior 34, (2012).  
And, Tessler, (2002), 349.  
 Tessler, (2010), 221, 230, 231.22
 Ibid., 238.23
 Tessler, 238.24
 Jamal and Tessler, 99.  25
tudes towards democracy.”   Others contend that “religious belief increases value-driven am26 -
bivalence towards democracy, while involvement in religious social networks decreases.”   Re27 -
sults suggest the strength of one’s belief and the extent of one’s involvement in religious social 
networks determines one’s ambivalence and relationship with democratic values.   
Islam may not predicate negative relationships with democracy and civil rights that are 
associated with it, but there are naturally some relevant variables, which do predict negative rela-
tionships towards democracy.  One such factor is authoritarianism, which refers to an individ-
ual’s near unyielding support for those in power and generally anti-democratic attitudes.  Author-
itarians generally do not hold egalitarian attitudes, are intolerant, and do not value freedom of 
expression.  Something Daphna Canetti-Nisim’s (2004) findings have shown to be true, specifi-
cally in regards to freedom of expression.   
 Canetti-Nisim agrees with Tessler’s previously cited work, that religion does not predict 
negative attitudes towards democracy nor democratic rights.   Using Ben-Meir and Kedem’s 28
Religiosity Index  and Altemeyer’s Scale for authoritarianism  she found that support for de29 30 -
!7
 Bloom and Arikan, 250.26
 Ibid., 251. 27
 Daphna Canetti-Nisim, ”The Effect of Religiosity on Endorsement of Democratic Values: The Mediating Influ28 -
ence of Authoritarianism," Political Behavior 26, no. 4 (2004):  377, 378.  
 Ibid., 381, 382.  For cited religiosity index see, Ben-Meir Y. and Kedem P. “Religiosity Index for the Jewish Popu29 -
lation in Israel,” Megamot 24: 353-362 (Hebrew).
 Ibid., 382.  For cited authoritarianism scale see Bob Altemeyer’s,  Enemies of Freedom: Understanding Right-30
wing Authoritarianism, Jossey-Bass, 1988.
mocratic values was only negative where authoritarianism existed in the individual.   Using 31
these scales, “the association between religiosity and democratic values is almost entirely medi-
ated by authoritarianism” and authoritarianism is more likely a predictor of “intolerance than re-
ligiosity.”   Since tolerance is assumed to be an essential component of democracy, authoritari32 -
ans natural tendency towards intolerance increases their likelihood of holding anti-democratic 
attitudes.  While the religious by their nature of being religious show deference to authority and 
are more likely to be authoritarian, all religious individuals are not authoritarian and therefore do 
not necessarily have negative attitudes towards freedom of speech.    33
 Since authoritarian traits play a role of significance in individual attitudes towards free-
dom of speech, it necessitates analysis.  As noted above, religion and authoritarianism can play 
an important role in how one relates to democratic values, but what are other significant vari-
ables?  Gender, religious freedom and state regulation of religions, in addition to attitudes held 
by individuals in post-communist contexts in relation to democracy, are variables highlighted in 
the literature as important determinants of an individual’s democratic values.   
!8
 Ibid., 382, 383. For cited democratic values scales see the following. Yuchtman-Yaar, E. and Peres, Y, Between 31
Consent and Dissent: Democracy and Peace in the Israeli Mind (2000).  And, Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, and 
Kaase, M. (1971), Demokratishce einstellung in der bundesrepublik Deutschland, In R Wildenman (ed.), Sozialwis-
senschaftliches Jahrbuch fur Politik, (2), 119-326. And, Miller, Helsi and Reisinger’s 1995 study of democratic val-
ues in the United States.
 Canetti-Nisim, (2004), 387.  John Duckitt and Farre Belinda, “Right-Wing Authoritarianism and Political Intoler32 -
ance among Whites in the Future Majority-rule South Africa,” Journal of Social Psychology 134, (1994):735-741.  
And Bob Altemeyer, , The Authoritarian Specter, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press: 1996).  And, Bruce Huns-
berger, “Religion and Prejudice: The Role of Religious Fundamentalism, Quest, and Right-wing Authoritarianism,” 
Journal of Social Issues 51, (1995): 113-129.  Canetti-Nisim and Beit-Hallahmi, 369.  Fathali M. Moghaddam,, and 
Vuk Vuksanovic, “Attitudes and Behavior Toward Human Rights Across Different Contexts: The Role of Right-
Wing Authoritarianism, Political Ideology, and Religiosity,” International Journal of Psychology 25, no. 2 (1990): 
455-474. 
 Canetti-Nisim, (2004), 388.  33
 Tessler (2002) finds that personal piety and Islamic attachments found among female re-
spondents, are statistically important in explaining negative attitudes toward democracy.   34
Women in Arab-Muslim countries were more likely to take direction from religion and religious 
authorities, than men, in relationship to politics.  With these findings, females who are more sup-
portive of religious influence than men are not rejecting democracy, rather they possess a more 
favorable view of the “justice and protection of the weak” they associate with Islamic practice, 
and potentially understand the strength of arguments based in Islam.   Another pattern relates to 35
“guidance in economic and commercial affairs.”    36
This economic pattern is the inverse relationship between the desire for Islamic guidance 
in economic and commercial affairs, and pro-democracy attitudes among women.  It is suggested 
that women unhappy with their current economics are more supportive of policies “guided by the 
values they associate with Islam” such as “justice, equality, social welfare, and protection of the 
weak,” and all personal values relating to the family.   Gender-linked effects reveal the impor37 -
tance of demographic considerations when analyzing individual attitudes towards democracy and 
democratic values. 
Regional and national contextual factors like a nation’s religious freedoms or state regula-
tion of religion, possession of a higher Freedom House rating, and post-Communist nations sup-
port for democracy, have been suggested as possible determinants for one’s relationship with 
!9
 Tessler, (2002), 348, 349. 34
 Ibid.35
 Ibid., 349.36
 Ibid.37
democracy and democratic values.   Nations with higher levels of religious freedom are less 38
supportive of democracy in their country context but more supportive of democracy in general.   39
State regulation has no relationship with individual support for democracy, “but (it has) a posi-
tive effect on endorsement of the democratic system.”   Individuals living in countries possess40 -
ing higher Freedom House ratings and or are post-communist are more critical of democracy,  41
in part due to secularizing effects communism has on these nations, and economic stagnation 
viewed by many as a direct result of the political and economic liberalization of post-communist 
societies.   The over-secularization characterizing post-communist societies may increase the 42
probability of citizen reliance upon government.  Consequently, they are less supportive of a sys-
tem they now rely on so heavily.  Displeasure with democracy in relation to economic failures 
may be a natural outworking of the democratization process, as people attach the idea of im-
proved economic lives to democratic governance.  Potentially, unhappiness concerning economic 
factors may influence outrage over forms of speech they see as further marginalizing their eco-
nomic potentials   
 Other interesting findings show an inconsistency in how the individual believes human 
and democratic rights should be viewed and applied to different country contexts.  In research 
conducted by Fathali M. Moghaddam and Vuk Vuksanovic (1990), respondents were more con-
!10
 Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart. “The Role of Ordinary People in the Democratization Process,” Journal of 38
Democracy 19, no.1 (2008): 126-240. 126, 128.
 Ben-Nun Bloom and Arikan, 263.39
 Ibid.40
 Ibid.41
 Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Develop42 -
ment Sequence, (Cambridge University Press, 2005): 67, 82, 109.
cerned with “basic” lower order rights in the developing world.  Basic standards of living were 
viewed as more important than higher-order democratic values, like freedom of expression.  This 
uneven application reveals a failure in the universality principle of human rights.   Individuals 43
surveyed were more likely to support human rights in the developing world rather than in their 
own.  44
 Inconsistencies such as these reveal an important element when one is interpreting atti-
tudes towards democracy, freedom of expression and responses to the Muhammad cartoons.  The 
failure in universal application helps researchers understand how respondents define, interpret 
and apply abstract concepts such as freedom of expression.  This may help explain that while 
many gathered in protest of the publication of the Muhammad cartoons; each person could use 
the same event to voice their own unrelated displeasure or grievance.  Interestingly, while 
protests over the publishing of unpopular cartoons, or negative portrayals of Muhammad in 
movie trailers like, Innocence of Muslims, were widespread, they were not necessarily represen-
tative of all Muslims.  To assume all Muslims felt this way employes a monolithic approach to 
religion and people.  Additionally, there are number of issues each protester could have had to 
motivate them to take to the streets to voice their displeasure.  All parties involved may be quite 
supportive of speech in general.  Still, they may believe these forms of speech are not within ac-
ceptable bounds of public discourse.  No matter one’s stance, context certainly influences their 
position on the issue. 
!!
!11
 Moghaddam and Vuksanovic, 458, 471.43
 Ibid., 455-474.44
III. Freedom of Expression !
 Freedom of expression is a right that includes freedom to hold opinions without interfer-
ence and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media, regardless of lo-
cation.   Freedom of speech and freedom of the press are fundamental elements to ensuring hu45 -
man dignity and they are part of the full realization of a broader set of self-expressive values.  
Before analyzing relationships between religiosity and freedom of speech, one must research the 
country and regional contexts.  Geographical location plays an important role in how individuals 
form and shape their attitudes towards speech.  Having a grasp on the broader regional relation-
ships to freedom of speech, usually manifested in the government relations with the press, in-
forms the researcher’s ability to analyze smaller individual level relationships.  
Freedom of Expression in the MENA 
 Authoritarian regimes by their nature expect and require citizens to obey, almost blindly, 
their policy and governance, and any attempt to broaden or expand free speech protections would 
likely be resisted, as it increases opportunity for criticism of their authoritarian practices.  Given 
the authoritarian nature of MENA regimes, press freedoms and freedom of expression would be 
expected to be heavily censored, and repressed.  
 According to Freedom House, the region is comprised of twenty-one countries and terri-
tories.   Freedom House country level freedom of expression scores range from 0-100, with 46
!12
 United Nations, “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights,” Available online at: www.un.org. 45
 Freedom House, “Middle East and North Africa,” Available online at: www.freedomhouse.org.46
0-30 considered Free, 31-60 Partly-Free and 61-100 indicating Not Free.   The average global 47
rating since 2002 is 46.5, and 44.0 without the MENA, which corresponds to the rating, Partly 
Free.  In contrast to the world average, the MENA has an astonishingly high average of 69.0, re-
flecting the region’s Not Free status with regards to freedom of the press.   
 The regional average since the advent of the Arab Spring went down from 71.0 to 68.3 
reflecting only marginal improvements in freedom of expression rights and press freedom.  Nev-
ertheless, for all the nations whose long-standing authoritarian leaders were removed, each saw, 
at the very least, a small improvement in their press freedom ratings.          
 For Arab Spring nations, the average rating was 81 in 2010.  Since that time the rating 
improved, dropping to 71 in 2013.  Whereas the MENA nations, without significant regime 
change during that same time, saw their rating worsen from 66.5 in 2010 to 67.1 following the 
advent of the Arab Spring.  The six Arab Spring nations experienced a decrease of 12% overall in 
comparison to the regional average, without Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen, 
which increased by about 1%.  In fact, Libya and Tunisia, as a percentage and absolute value 
change, saw the most dramatic improvement, both regionally and globally. 
According to Freedom House ratings, all but one of the MENA nations are Not Free.  
These results could reinforce age-old assumptions and generalizations about the region and its 
culture’s (i.e., Islam’s) compatibility with democracy.  As such, the debate regarding Islamic 
practice and democracy remains at the forefront of discussions of freedom of expression in the 
!13
 While Freedom House ratings are based upon numerous sources, in general they do weight government legislation 47
heavily, which creates the appearance of freedom, but for the individual, little has changed (Welzel and Ingelhart, 
2008, pg. 128).  Corruption is still rampant and censorship may still be widespread.  These weaknesses do not inval-
idate Freedom House ratings, but rather shows the need for other measures to be included in country and regional 
level analysis (see Transparency International, 2012)
MENA.  Now that the press freedom in the MENA has been analyzed, revealing an unfree and 
highly censored environment, a more detailed discussion of the literature regarding the determi-
nants of freedom of expression at the individual level, will be attempted. 
Determinants of Freedom of Expression 
Both the literature and current democratic developments in the MENA reveal support for 
democracy as a theory of governance.  This begs the question: if MENA societies seek democrat-
ic governance characterized by a citizenry desirous of self-expressive values, then what influ-
ences these values?   
Self-expression can be considered part of the “human development triad...consisting of 
three elements: action resources, self-expression values, and democratic institutions.”   Action 48
resources are knowledge-based items like education and cognitive intellectual skills that encour-
age independent thinking.   Self-expressive societies value self-expression, egalitarianism, tol49 -
erance, interpersonal trust,  and freedom of speech.   Self-expressive values are directly related 50 51
to a society’s respect for free choice.  These societies value the voice and agency of the individ-
ual.  It is suggested that when societies move from survival-based low-income agrarian ways of 
life, to higher-income knowledge-based ones, democratic values and “freedoms” become more 
“imperative as people have the resources needed to practice them.”   52
!14
 Welzel and Inglehart, (2008), 129.48
 Ibid.  49
 Ibid.  50
 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris,  “A True Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Policy 135 (2003): 62-70.51
 Inglehart and Norris, 62-70.52
 Acknowledging that support for democracy is different than actually wanting a liberal 
democratic society is an important distinction.  One could want democracy but fail to possess the 
knowledge and characteristics that foster it.  This leads some to argue that self-expressive values 
are actually a more significant predicator for democratization, than mere support for 
democracy.   These values prioritize abstract concepts such as freedom, and some suggest a 53
strong correlation between “self-expression values and effective democracy.”  54
Self-expressive values that precede the shift to a more democratic society ensure that the 
sense of autonomy which accompanies this shift encourages people to claim both their civil and 
political rights.  Since freedom of speech is both a right and a tool by which individuals in soci-
ety claims their rights, it is essential to understand how assorted variables affect people’s views, 
attitudes and relationship to freedom of speech.  One set of variables which affects people’s atti-
tudes towards freedom of speech is demographics.  Research suggests that age plays an impor-
tant factor in freedom of speech and willingness of the individual to censor, though the relation-
ship remains contested.  55
 Karen L. Bird (2000) finds older individuals to be more comfortable with censorship of 
hate speech, whereas younger individuals tend to be more open to the existence of extremist po-
litical groups.   Interestingly, Gloria Cowan (1992) does not find any relationship between age 56
!15
 Welzel and Inglehart, (2008), 133.  A finding confirmed in Inglehart’s, “How Solid is Mass Support for Democra53 -
cy--And How Can we Measure It?,” PS: Political Science and Politics 36, (2003) : 51-57. And, Welzel’s, “Are Lev-
els of Democracy Affected by Mass Attitudes? Testing Attainment and Sustainment Effects on Democracy,” In-
ternational Political Science Review 28, (2003): 397-424.
 Welzel and Inglehart, (2008), 132.54
 Jennifer L. Lambe, "Who Wants to Censor Pornography and Hate Speech?," Mass Communication & Society 7, 55
no. 3 (2004): 281.
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and censorship.   Still others have found the relationship of age and censorship attitudes to be 57
dependent on the content subject to censoring.  Older participants viewed censorship in general, 
less positively, except for pornography.   Hernando Rojas, Dhavan V. Shah, and Ronald J. Faber 58
(1996) report a positive connection between age and desire to censor.   While these findings are 59
not entirely consistent with each other, one pattern does emerge: age influences attitudes towards 
specific types of speech.  Age is an example of the importance in considering how one’s role in 
society informs and shapes one’s interaction with it.   
 In addition to age, numerous studies have shown differences across genders regarding 
free expression.  In general, men possess a more open understanding and broader application of 
civil liberties.   Women tend to support censorship in relation to pornography and sexually ex60 -
plicit material more than men.   Furthermore, women are more likely to perceive the harm of 61
hate speech than men, whereas men are likely to view the importance of freedom of speech high-
er than women.   Contrasting with the above consensus others have found, women are no more 62
likely than men in generalized support for “expressive rights.”  63
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 The relationship between gender and support for freedom of speech weakens when one 
accounts for ideological orientations.  Men’s support for freedom of speech is less strong when 
powerful right-wing political orientations are held.   Previous studies found one’s liberal-con64 -
servative self-ranking and one’s personal liberalism to be significant factors affecting attitudes 
towards freedom of speech.   Liberals, in this context, are characterized as “intellectually inde65 -
pendent,” “broad-minded,” and tolerant of different ideas and beliefs from their own.   On the 66
one hand, liberalism is thought to be an important individual predictor in support of free speech: 
increased importance given to freedom of speech is directly related to higher levels of liberalism. 
On the contrary, greater conservatism is associated with increased opposition to free 
expression.   Individualism is closely linked to liberalism.  Individualists value free speech and 67
emphasize liberty, while opposing “external control and authority.”   Individualism is also char68 -
acterized by a self-reliance emphasizing personal freedom.   Individualism, like liberalism is an 69
important predictor of high levels of support for freedom of speech.   70
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 Education and intellect are also important factors which influence individual attitudes 
towards free speech.  More often than not, educated individuals are less likely to censor expres-
sion,  but there are some who suggest otherwise.   Again, like gender and age there can be con71 72 -
flicting conclusions as researchers’ personal interpretations and biases influence available data.  
While there are clearly disagreements in the previously mentioned variables, in general, intellect 
at the individual level seems to correlate positively with attitudes towards freedom of expression. 
 Intellect is an “individual attribute that should be related to understanding and acknowl-
edging the importance of free speech.”   A person who possesses intellect can be described as 73
insightful, introspective, imaginative, and having an array of interests.   In order to completely 74
grasp the abstract concept of free speech, “one must be able to distinguish between the costs of 
speech in the immediate state, and the broader, more long-term implications” of the freedom.   75
An individual with high intellect is more likely to grapple with issues concerning the harm to the 
target of speech and “long-term social harm” of speech regulation.   These individuals seek a 76
deeper understanding of complex issues, seeing the costs of suppression of unwanted and unpop-
ular forms of speech as potentially causing harm to democratic societies. 
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 As mentioned already, research strongly suggests that MENA citizens are not opposed to 
democracy, and a number of studies have shown that a majority are in fact supportive of democ-
racy as a system of government.   Weaknesses of some arguments on the region decontextualize 77
people’s responses when comparing them to other more “traditional” “democratic” nations.  How 
different religious groups interact with their society, both public and private, is very different 
from country to country, even within in a given geographic region, let alone a broader in-
ternational one.  However, regional research regarding religion, democracy and democratic val-
ues consistently shows, no matter the context, that religion does not equate to antidemocratic 
values.  
 Throughout the MENA, especially given the recent political upheaval, views concerning 
democratic development and values will undoubtedly continue to change.  The existence of de-
mocratic values in the MENA is not new, but current popular support of these values do appear 
to have increased in their public display, as witnessed by the continued protesting in the region.  
As part of this democratic evolution in the region, relationships with core human rights (especial-
ly freedom of speech), will continue to change.   
As the MENA grapples with uncertain transitions, what role will Islamic practice play for 
Muslims in how they interact with these changes?  While Islam does not affect democracy as a 
theory of government, how might individual interpretations of Islam influence attitudes towards 
democracy in practice?  A democracy with its self-expressive rights is no longer such a distant 
concept.  No doubt it will have some influence, but will Islam as a religious worldview and prac-
tice be the dominant factor in shaping and influencing conceptions of freedom of expression in 
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the MENA?  If so, does the religious practice in the lives of Muslims only suppress and restrict 
people’s expression of ideas?  The intent of my work will be to determine the affect that religios-
ity has on free speech.  This work argues that the practice of Islam is not the only, or even most 
important, factor in individual attitudes towards free expression in the region.  Rather, it is 
strongly-held individual authoritarian traits and important demographic factors, such as educa-
tion and gender, which truly influence attitudes.  
To examine these relationships, I undertake a comparison of two countries, Morocco and 
Lebanon.  I will use survey data in each country, collected by the Arab Barometer Project, to as-
sess individual attitudes towards freedom of speech, and specifically the role of religiosity in 
how it affects tolerance and support for freedom of expression.   
IV. Freedom of Expression in Lebanon and Morocco  
 As democratic development is rapidly underway in the MENA, knowledge of how the 
citizens in the region relate to a broad set of democratic rights is required.  While there are nu-
merous potential relationships to analyze, this essay will focus on relationships between individ-
ual religiosity and freedom of speech, in addition to, authoritarianism and freedom of speech.  
Also included will be relevant demographics which have been shown to influence individual atti-
tudes towards democratic rights and freedom of speech.   Analyzing all available data would be 78
ideal but beyond the scope of this work.  The examination of Morocco and Lebanon will provide 
some unique and relevant insights concerning individual attitudes towards freedom of speech.   
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 The survey data collected for Morocco were in-person interviews conducted in Arabic 
during the Fall of 2006, that included 1277 respondents over the age of eighteen which was ap-
proximately 50% female and 50% male.  Interviewees were chosen from 100 zones (60 urban 
and 40 rural), that took “quotas for type of living situation, gender, age, whether married or not, 
socio-economic level and level of education.”   The survey data collected for Lebanon were in-79
person interviews conducted in Arabic during the Fall of 2007, that included 1195 respondents, 
over the age of eighteen which was approximately 50% female and 50% male.  The sample was 
“nationally representative” “drawn from a master sampling frame” based on a complete variety 
of localities which included small and medium villages, and small and large towns and cities.”   80
Before moving forward, it must be noted that samples are only considered representative of the 
countries where the surveys were conducted, and any conclusion beyond the borders of these two 
nations will be and should be done so with hesitancy as this work acknowledges the distinct dif-
ferences between the citizens of these countries and their neighbors.  Now, I turn to a brief case 
selection analysis.   
Case Selection: Why Morocco and Lebanon? 
 In a study of attitudes towards freedom of expression, nations such as Morocco, where 
large portions of the citizenry feel uncomfortable criticizing their own government, warrant re-
search.  Far too much reliance solely on economic factors has created the view of Morocco being 
a “liberal” state.   Some insist Morocco is exceptional having found a “third path,” somewhere 81
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between the traditional authoritarian monarchy and a liberal democracy.   Morocco has certainly 82
liberalized their economy.  Considering the suggested wealth of the Monarchy, economic liberal-
ization appears to have done more to enrich national leaders than develop the country economi-
cally.   Moreover, liberalization has largely ended with economic matters, and political liberal83 -
ization continues to falter.  As such, it is unclear whether or not a third-path has been found.    84
Nevertheless, the monarchy since independence from France in 1954, has seen it beneficial to 
encourage multiple political groups.   Morocco’s unique place in the Arab world as a “modern” 85
“liberal” monarchy lends itself to analysis that considers relationships between personal attitudes 
and democratic values, such as freedom of expression.  Political pluralism does not characterize 
Moroccan governance or much of the MENA for that matter.  However, in a region where au-
thoritarians have strived to eliminate political pluralism, the Lebanese system remains pluralistic.    
 Lebanon is a country with a long standing history of political pluralism, but it also  has a 
history of political instability characterized by assassinations and war.  Lebanese political leader-
ship is allocated according to religious sects.  Political power and positions are divided among 
the various religious sects, including Christians, Sunni Muslims, Shiite Muslims and Druze.   86
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The National Pact of 1943 was an unwritten agreement that further solidified the division.  The 
pact stipulated that the president would be a Maronite Christian, the prime minister a Sunni Mus-
lim, and the speaker of parliament a Shiite Muslim.  Druze and other religious communities are 
allotted a number of other cabinet posts.   Despite the instability, elections are held regularly, the 87
press is free, public debate remains strong and healthy, and Lebanon has remained a “political 
refuge and free enterprise for the rest of the region.”   In addition, Lebanon has an influential 88
parliament.   
This is a stark contrast to Morocco.  Morocco is ruled by an authoritarian government, 
has a weak parliament, the press is censored and dissidence is suppressed, and Morocco remains 
economically stagnant.   The divergent systems of Morocco and Lebanon suggest very different 89
relationships with freedom of expression.  One would expect that the individuals in both coun-
tries would also hold very different attitudes toward freedom of expression.  Consequently, this 
contrast should produce some compelling results concerning the subject.   
 It is well established that individuals in different countries, including those of the MENA, 
even if they are of the same ethnicity, cultural backgrounds, religion etc., hold views and possess 
attitudes different from one another.  As noted by Tessler (2002 and 2010) Jamal and Tessler 
(2008), it has also been established that being devoutly Muslim is not a convincing predictor of 
anti-democratic attitudes, or of pro-democratic attitudes.  However, if individuals are viewed 
within their country context, different trends may emerge in religious or non-religious citizens 
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and authoritarian or non-authoritarians, in Morocco and Lebanon as they relate to freedom of 
expression.   Because Morocco and Lebanon have different systems of government, centers of 90
power, economic successes and failures, and relationships to freedom of expression, they remain 
important sites for analysis. 
!
V. Data: The Arab Barometer Survey, Wave I !
 In an attempt to better understand the determinants of attitudes and support for freedom 
of expression in the MENA, I will use the Arab Barometer Survey conducted between 2006 and 
2008 in Morocco, Algeria, Kuwait, Palestine (West Bank and Gaza), Jordan, Lebanon and 
Yemen.   Arab Barometer data will provide a window into individual attitudes and values prior 91
to the Arab Spring.  The survey’s focus on attitudes and beliefs related to pluralism, freedoms, 
democratic understandings and religiosity, is particularly well suited to answering questions con-
cerning the relationship between religiosity and freedom of speech.  
 There are issues concerning the use of survey data due to the inherently subjective nature 
of survey questions and responses.  Some of those points of contention relate to cognitive issues, 
social desirability and attitudinal existence.   Cognitive issues relate to framing of questions and 92
differences in responses that illicit minor changes.  Social desirability refers to variances in re-
!24
 Pascal Menoret, “Leaving Islamic Activism Behind: Ambigius Disengagement in Saudi Arabia,” in Social move90 -
ments, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, Edited by Joel Beinin, and Frédéric 
Vairel, (Stanford University Press, 2011).
 The Arab Barometer addresses a wide range of “attitudes, values and behavior patterns relating to pluralism, free91 -
doms, tolerance and equal opportunity; social and inter-personal trust; social, religious and political identities; con-
ceptions of governance and an understanding of democracy; and civic engagement and political participation.” Arab 
Barometer I, Arab Barometer, www.arabbarometer.org. 
 Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mullainathan, "Do People Mean What They Say? Implications for Subjective 92
Survey Data,” The American Economic Review 91, no. 2 (2001): 67-72.
sponses by people, who answer questions in the ways they believe they should answer, but they 
are not necessarily a reflection of the attitudes they truly hold.  Attitudinal existence represents 
attitudes possessed by respondents that do not exist coherently, because respondents answer 
questions concerning their attitudes only because the question is asked, leading some to believe 
the question to be important.  If the question is important, then one must have a response.  Those 
holding skeptical views of survey data argue that people frame their responses in this constructed 
and unnatural context leading to less valid and reliable results.  In this case, the respondent may 
not have a proper grasp of the subject or their view, consequently their views change, sometimes 
dramatically.  Despite its drawbacks, economists like Marianne Bertrand and Sendhil Mul-
lainathan (2001), support the use of surveys because these subjective measures are useful as long 
as the results are interpreted with care.   Survey data possesses a wealth of information, some93 -
thing even skeptics reluctantly acknowledge, which can be a useful tool to understand individual 
level attitudes. 
Variable Description and Summary Statistics 
 This section introduces all the relevant variables that will be considered for analysis.   
While not exhaustive, the indicators chosen help shed light on individuals’ concepts and ideas 
related to democracy and civil rights.  The main indicators include freedom of speech, religiosity, 
authoritarianism and some demographics factors.  Respondents who declined to answer or re-
sponded “don’t know” are excluded from the results.  94
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Freedom of Speech 
   As the main focus of this work, I use two questions to capture individual attitudes to-
ward freedom of speech and expression, and one question to grasp individual views of their 
country-level freedom of speech context.  The first question captures views on disagreement 
among political groups, revealing potential comfort levels with positions they may not agree 
with.  The second question asks people to give their opinion of their personal comfort in criticiz-
ing their own government.  The final question reveals the importance that the individual places 
on leader’s openness and comfort with both political ideas they agree with, and ones they do not.  
The following are the indicators and possible responses relevant to freedom of speech chosen for 
this work: 
!
!
!
!
1.  How much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements? 
a) Competition and disagreement among political groups is not a 
bad thing for our country
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2.  Now I am going to read to you a list of statements that de-
scribe how people often feel about the state affairs in [country 
name].  Please tell me whether you strongly agree, somewhat 
agree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree with each of 
these statement.
  b) People are free to criticize government without fear.
 In Morocco and Lebanon, nearly two-thirds of survey respondents agree that competition, 
disagreement and debate are preferable.  In Morocco, of all respondents, only 36% believe they 
are free to criticize their government, and 57% believe they are not free to criticize their govern-
ment.  Moroccan respondents also overwhelming (87%) believe that openness to diverse political 
ideas is an important factor that qualifies a leader for political office.  In Lebanon, 87% of re-
spondents claim they are free to criticize their government and 97% believe a leader with open-
ness to diverse political ideas is someone they considered to be qualified. 
 Both countries’ respondents affirm their support of the democratic system as way of gov-
erning and supporting civil rights.  In Morocco, 90% of respondents support democracy and in 
Lebanon, support was at 92%.  Support for democracy in theory does not necessarily lead to 
support for it in practice.  For example, in Lebanon, only 15% believe it is ever justifiable to vio-
late human rights for national security or stability of the nation.  Whereas in Morocco, 40% be-
lieve it is completely justifiable to violate human rights to promote security and stability.   
 Generally, both country respondents are supportive of democracy and freedom of speech, 
in theory.  In addition, both countries’ respondents are quite supportive of diverse points of view 
from their leaders.  In fact, citizens believe it is a requirement for political office.  However in-
terestingly, in the case of Morocco, respondents were less supportive of rights like freedom of 
3.  People sometimes talk about factors that make a person qual-
ified for national leadership.  On this card are listed some of the 
qualifications to which different people would give priority.  
Please state which one these you, yourself, consider  the most 
important.
  b) Openness to diverse political ideas.
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speech.  This was evidenced by their willingness to suppress rights in the name of security and 
stability.  The same cannot be said for Lebanon, as they were not supportive of the idea of sup-
pression of rights for the sake of security and stability. 
Religiosity 
 To understand the role that individual level religiosity plays in explaining attitudes to-
ward freedom, I use the following indicators: 
 There may be several religious traditions practiced in both countries, but the variations 
between different religious practices will not be analyzed, as data for Morocco regarding reli-
gious traditions other than Islam, are unavailable.  The questions pertaining specifically to indi-
vidual religiosity are sufficient to obtain a grasp of the religiosity of Moroccan and Lebanese re-
spondents.  Both countries exhibit similarly levels of religiosity.   
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1. Do you Pray?
a) Yes b) No
2.  Do you pray at:
a) Mosque b) Home c)Both  d) Church
3.  How often do you read the Quran?
a) Everyday or Almost Everyday 
b) Several Times a Week 
c) Sometimes 
d) Rarely 
e) I don’t Read
 On questions relating to prayer, 82% of respondents in Morocco claimed they prayed and 
86% of respondents in Lebanon claimed the same.  When asked where prayer takes place, only 
4% of respondents in Morocco prayed solely at the mosque, nearly 45% claimed they prayed at 
home and another 51% prayed at both.  Like respondents in Morocco, the Lebanese stated that 
3% of them prayed at the mosque, 38% prayed at home and nearly 50% prayed at both.   
 These religious figures show little difference in individual habits with regard to prayer, 
but differences in levels of reading of the Qur’an were noticeable.  For Lebanese respondents, 
just over 82% read the Qur’an at least on a rare occasion, and 32% read it at least several times a 
week.  In contrast, only 59% of Moroccans surveyed read it at least rarely, and only 23% read it 
at least several times a week.  For Morocco and Lebanon, these numbers are likely representative 
of both countries’ literacy levels.  The most recent CIA World Factbook claims the Lebanese lit-
eracy rate to be almost 90%, whereas the Moroccan literacy rate was at a much lower 67%.  The 
numbers of those who read the Qur’an is naturally influenced by the ability to read a text.  Con-
sequently, this data correlates between percentages of those who read the Qur’an and those who 
do not. 
Authoritarianism 
 Authoritarian traits possessed by an individual are usually an influential factor and pre-
dictor of negative relationships to democracy and democratic attitudes.   Authoritarian individu95 -
als tend to value conservation of perceived or real historic values and more importantly, an un-
usually strong deference to authority, in contrast to non-authoritarian individuals.   To assess 96
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individual authoritarian levels and its relationship to freedom of speech the following indicators 
were used: 
 Agreement with the first question suggests that a citizen possesses authoritarian traits.  A 
potential counterargument is that support for one’s government, when they disagree with its ac-
tions or policies, does not always equate to authoritarian beliefs.  It may be an admission that po-
litical peace and stability are more important than freedom of expression.  One could imagine an 
individual holding this position and placing survival level values over higher order ones, but he 
or she would still be considered to hold authoritarian views.  Relying on one question to deter-
mine a set of typical traits concerning authoritarianism reveals a limitation.  Unfortunately, creat-
ing an index based on other survey research is beyond the scope of this work. 
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1.  Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: 
“People should always support the decisions of their 
government even if they disagree with these decisions”:
a) Strongly agree.  b) Agree. 
c) Disagree.   d) Strongly disagree. 
e) Can’t choose.  f) Decline to Answer.
2.  I’m going to describe various types of political systems and 
ask what you think about each as a way of governing [country 
name].  For each one, would you say it is a very good, fairly 
good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing  [country name]?
a) Democratic political system (public freedom, equal political 
and civil rights,balance of power, accountability and 
transparency). 
b) A strong non-democratic leader that does not bother with 
parliament and elections 
c) Having experts rather than government make decisions 
according to what is best for the country 
d) A system that is a mixture of the above three under one ruler
 Nearly 60% of Moroccans either agree or strongly agree that one should support their 
government even when wrong.  In contrast, only 27% of Lebanese respondents agreed with this 
statement.  Ninety-four percent of Lebanese respondents perceived a singular “non-democratic” 
leader who does not bother with democratic processes, as bad or very bad.  Whereas 73% of Mo-
roccans felt that a “non-democratic” leader that does not bother with democratic process was bad 
or very bad.  
 While a significant percentage of Moroccans claim that authoritarianism is a bad or very 
bad system of government, a significant percentage also feels it is important to support leader-
ship, even when leadership is wrong.  This apparent inconsistency is difficult to explain, and may 
be related to the unique political system of the nation.  Authoritarian and non-authoritarian re-
sponses in both countries, reveals citizenries with a very different relationship to their govern-
ment, society, and history.  Authoritarian levels will produce very different responses in attitudes 
towards freedom of speech. 
Demographic Variables 
In addition to the religious and authoritarian makeup of the survey respondents discussed 
in the previous sections, I will also examine the relationship between key demographic variables.  
These are important determinants of attitudes towards democracy and freedom of speech.   Such 97
variables include gender, education, and age, all of which have been highlighted as important 
determinants of attitudes towards democracy.  The rights associated with them are freedom of 
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religion, freedom of conscience, freedom of movement and freedom of speech.   As stated pre98 -
viously, all participants were over the age of 18 and the gender distribution for both Morocco and 
Lebanon was approximately 50% female and 50% male.   
 The Arab Barometer separates their respondents’ level of education into seven different 
categories: illiterate, elementary, primary, secondary, college diploma or two years of college 
(associate’s degree), bachelor’s degree and master’s or higher.  The country breakdown is as fol-
lows.  In Morocco, nearly 40% of respondents claimed they were illiterate, 25% had completed 
elementary, 17% had completed primary school, 9% had completed secondary school and less 
than 11% had completed more than two years of college.   
 In contrast, only 2% of Lebanese respondents were illiterate, 8% had completed elemen-
tary school, 24% had completed primary school, 24% had completed secondary school, and by 
comparison to Morocco, a staggering 42% of Lebanese respondents had a two or four year de-
gree, and or master’s or higher level of college education.  One would expect the higher educa-
tion levels in Lebanon to strongly predict far more openness to ideas concerning freedom of ex-
pression, as noted in previous sections of this work.  
 Affirmed by Tesser (2002), Lambe (2004), Downs and Cowan (2012), these demographic 
factors are expected to play an important role in determining attitudes of Moroccan and Lebanese 
respondents.  However, following Tessler’s  (2002) work on both countries, this work expects 
gender to play the most significant role with regards to the demographic variables considered.  In 
the next section we will begin our bivariate analysis. 
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VI. Explaining Attitudes toward Freedom of Expression in Morocco and Lebanon  
!
In this section an analysis of the relationships and associations laid out in this work will 
be undertaken.  The comparisons made attempt to reveal which factors are most important in ex-
plaining attitudes toward freedom of speech.  While, as noted previously, there are a number of 
factors that could be included in this analysis, this work will focus on bivariate variables.  The 
main relationships of interest are those between religiosity and freedom of speech, authoritarian-
ism and freedom of speech, and specific demographics and freedom of speech, with religiosity, 
authoritarianism and demographics as the independent variables.  In focusing on freedom of 
speech specifically, rather than the broader topic of support for democracy overall, this research 
will add a layer to an already established model of viewing democracy and democratic civil 
rights in the MENA.  In other words, most of the literature on religion in the region focuses only 
on the broader relationship between Islam in practice at the individual level and democracy.  
Through a specific analysis of freedom of speech as it relates to democracy, this work will 
present a nuanced view on the MENA.   
Religiosity 
 The main variable considered as it relates to freedom of speech, is the individual religios-
ity of a respondent, simply determined by whether the individual prays or not.  Table 1 shows the 
relationship between this indicator of religiosity and freedom to criticize the government.  In 
Morocco, of the religious (those who pray), 40% agree they are free to criticize the government, 
which leaves nearly 60% feeling they are not free to do so.  Comparing that with those who do 
not pray, 28% claim they are free, and 71% state they are not free to criticize their government.  
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These results suggest a relationship between religiosity and increased comfort in expressing 
opinion in Morocco. 
When the same relationship is considered in Lebanon, there is no significant  statistical 
relationship between religiosity and freedom to criticize the government, at least when measured 
by whether an individual prays or not (See Table 2).  Nearly 90% of all respondents feel free to 
criticize their government.  Based upon the perception of Lebanon being a liberal media envi-
ronment, as confirmed by Freedom House ratings, the results of the Arab Barometer where it 
concerns free speech, support commonly held assumptions that Lebanese society is characterized 
by “vigorous” debate.  99
Moroccan respondents, shown by Table 3, both the religious and those who are not, be-
lieve openness to diverse opinions, is an important trait for an elected official to possess.  Most 
Moroccan respondents strongly agree or agree (91%) that political leaders’ openness to diverse 
opinions is an important or very important qualification.  Interestingly, the religious are more 
likely to believe it to be a very important quality, much more so than the unreligious.  Sixty-three 
percent of Moroccan respondents who prayed thought it a very important quality.  Forty-nine 
percent of those who do not pray felt that it is very important.  In Morocco, being religious in-
creases the chances one will be supportive of a leader who is open to diverse opinions.  In 
Lebanon, shown in Table 4, both the religious and the non-religious almost exclusively believe 
openness to diverse opinions to be an  an important or very important quality in a political leader, 
and as such, there is no relationship between religiosity and attitudes towards freedom of speech. 
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 While both countries’ respondents had opposite views on whether they were supportive 
of rights suppression in the name of national security, for Moroccans, more so than the Lebanese, 
support or rejection of rights suppression was not predicated on the religiosity of the individual 
(Table 5 and 6).  Those who are religious are no more or less likely to support suppression of 
rights.  These results appear to contradict with widely held views and generalizations about reli-
gious individuals regarding their willingness to submit to authority.   100
 Suppression and anti-freedom of speech values are not exclusively a belief or behavior of 
the religious, and the tendency to equate lack of openness to diversity in ideas, thoughts and peo-
ple, as a trait of the religious, does not follow from the data analyzed here.  Since one’s religiosi-
ty does not necessarily predict negative relationships to freedom of speech or freedom of expres-
sion, then it appears that other more influential factors may play a bigger role than one’s religios-
ity.   As the work of Tessler (2002), Canetti-Nisim (2004), Amaney Jamal and Tessler (2008) 101
did not find strong evidence of a relationship between religiosity with democracy and democratic 
values, neither does this work suggest a strong relationship between religiosity and freedom of 
speech. 
Authoritarianism 
 As Canetti-Nisim (2004) and Downs and Cowan (2012) showed, authoritarianism at the 
individual level predicts a negative relationships to freedom of speech.  Consequently, authoritar-
ianism at the individual level in the MENA should also predicate negative attitude towards free-
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dom of speech.  Which is why authoritarianism plays a central role in the analysis on both Mo-
rocco and Lebanon.   
 For Morocco, as seen in Table 7, most people support political disagreement.  Overall, 
Moroccans are supportive of competition among political groups.  This is especially true, when 
we look at the relationship between authoritarianism and support for political diversity and com-
petition.  Interestingly, we see that authoritarians are more supportive of political competition.  
This appears to contradict popular held understandings of authoritarians.   For the non-authori102 -
tarians in Morocco, it is more likely for them to fear disagreement and competition in society 
because their views, by their nature, are less likely to coincide with the views held by those in 
power.  This is discussed in more detail in Section VII. 
 Table 8 shows that Lebanese respondents were not nearly as supportive as Moroccan re-
spondents when it comes to diverse political opinions.  Forty-five percent of those who are 
strongly authoritarian strongly agree, that diversity in competition and disagreement among po-
litical groups is a good thing.  Whereas only 34% of those who are strongly non-authoritarian 
feel the same.  Again, like in Morocco, authoritarians might naturally be more supportive of 
competition and disagreement in Lebanon, because their views are supportive of the status quo.  
The same cannot be said for non-authoritarians in Lebanon.  These Lebanese non-authoritarians 
have experienced competition and disagreement, but because Lebanon remains plagued by inter-
nal strife and instability, non-authoritarians do not support their system.    103
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 While both countries were supportive of competition and disagreement, there were mixed 
results in the how comfortable respondents were in criticizing the government.  Moroccans, both 
authoritarian and non-authoritarian, were far less likely to feel comfortable criticizing govern-
ment than the Lebanese authoritarians and non-authoritarians.  But interestingly for Moroccans, 
as seen in Table 9, those who are the least authoritarian as a percentage of their category are far 
less comfortable criticizing their government.  Forty percent of all strongly non-authoritarian in-
dividuals strongly disagree that they are able to criticize their government.  Given the current po-
litical context in Morocco this comes as no surprise.  Considering the popularity and power of 
King Muhammad VI, an authoritarian leader by any account, authoritarians would be supportive 
of him, and therefore have little fear of criticizing him, because their views would most likely be 
in agreement with his.  Non-authoritarians are less supportive of authoritarian ideals, and less 
supportive of him, so they would be far more fearful of criticizing him.  
 In contrast, we can see from Table 10 that 87% of Lebanese respondents either strongly 
agree or agree that they are free to criticize their government.  Even more so than in Morocco, 
70% of strongly authoritarian Lebanese people feel that they are free to criticize their govern-
ment, but only 54% of the non-authoritarians agree that they are free to criticize.  These numbers 
may reveal a context in which they have experienced democracy and have found it lacking, and 
consequently, values associated with it are viewed less positively. 
 Figure 1 presents the relationship between authoritarianism and support for restricting 
human rights in the name of national security.  In line with Canetti-Nisim (2004) and Downs and 
Cowan (2012) findings on authoritarians, in both Lebanon and Morocco, authoritarians felt it 
more justifiable to restrict human rights in the name of national security and stability than re-
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spondents who hold non-authoritarian values.  In Morocco, 79% of those strongly authoritarian 
respondents believed the government should restrict rights in the name of stability and security, 
whereas only 52% of those strongly non-authoritarian were supportive.  Nevertheless, in both 
countries, the relationship between authoritarianism and support for rights suppression are statis-
tically significant.  Those who are more authoritarian in both Morocco and Lebanon, predictably 
feel it is justified to restrict human rights in the name of stability and security.  
The tendency repeats itself at every level from authoritarian to non-authoritarian.  As Mo-
roccan respondents were less authoritarian, they became less supportive of rights suppression.  
Over one-third of strongly non-authoritarians felt it not justifiable in any circumstances, in con-
trast to the 12% of the strongly authoritarian respondents feeling the same way.  Lebanon reveals 
a similar pattern.  While 67% of Lebanese who were strongly authoritarian believed that rights 
suppression was never justified, that still falls well short of the 85% of those who were strongly 
non-authoritarian, believing rights suppression was never justified.  
Another important finding was between authoritarianism and views concerning the quali-
fications of political leaders (See Table 11 and 12).  Respondents from both countries believed an 
important qualification of political office holders was openness to diverse political opinion.  In 
Lebanon, 97% of all respondents believed diversity of opinion was an important or very impor-
tant value.  The only respondents in either county who were at or below 93% support were those 
who were strongly non-authoritarian in Morocco.  Nearly one-fifth of Moroccan respondents did 
not feel openness to diverse political opinions important, but again an overwhelming majority 
did.   
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 In conclusion, the data analyzed with reference to authoritarian traits at the individual 
levels, reveals some compelling relationships.  First, while Moroccans are generally more sup-
portive of authoritarian leaders, Moroccan respondents were just as likely to support openness to 
debate and were quite supportive of free speech. They were more supportive of free speech even 
when they felt they are less at liberty to use said freedom than their Lebanese counterparts.  
Lebanese respondents while supportive of freedom of speech, those who do not possess authori-
tarian views have less positive attitudes towards diversity of opinion and disagreement in poli-
tics.  Now that both religiosity and authoritarian traits have been analyzed as independent vari-
ables, the final site for analysis will be demographic make-up of the survey respondents.   
Demographics 
 Numerous demographic factors influence attitudes towards freedom of expression, and 
the Arab Barometer provides ample amounts of data.  However, the ones included in this work 
are, gender, age and education.  All three are variables shown in previous research to play an in-
fluential role in relationship to the subject of democratic rights rights associated with 
democracy.  104
 In Morocco, the differences between genders were not drastically different with regard to 
competition and disagreement between political groups.  As seen in Table 13, 47% of male re-
spondents strongly agreed with the competition and disagreement indicators and 39% of females 
strongly agreed.  While the nearly 8% difference is important, it is made up however, in the dif-
ference with those who “somewhat agree.”  Thirty-eight percent of women and only 31% of men 
claimed they somewhat agreed with competition and disagreement among political groups.      
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 Following the trend of general support for democracy in Lebanon, both men and women 
were quite supportive of democracy as system which possesses freedom and civil rights (See Ta-
ble 14).  While men were about 6% more supportive in the “very good” response category, over-
all, 95% of both women and men stated democracy was good or very good.  Men were the most 
supportive of democracy, and both genders were overwhelmingly supportive of democracy in 
general.  Consequently, there was no relationship between gender and support for democracy in 
Lebanon.  In Morocco, support for democracy as a way of governing was viewed more positive-
ly by men, however, it appears that the difference is only somewhat more likely in supporting the 
system when the response was “very good” (See Table 15). 
 In Lebanon, no matter one’s age, repression of rights for stability and security purposes 
was viewed as never justifiable.  While there was very little difference between those of various 
age groups of statistical significance, responses to competition and disagreement among political 
groups varied among gender.  On both extremes (see Table 16), those strongly supportive and 
those strongly against, women were shown to be less supportive of competition and disagree-
ment between political groups, a confirmation of research by Tessler (2002) and Downs in Cow-
an (2012).  Women were approximately 11% less supportive of disagreement, when the response 
was “strongly agree”, and almost 7% more in strong disagreement where competition and dis-
agreement between political groups was concerned.  
 Another telling result found in Lebanon, was the relationship that education level had on 
attitudes towards disagreement and competition among political groups (See Table 17).  As the 
education level of the respondent increased, support for democracy as a system, increased.  
While all Lebanese were supportive of democracy, only 64% of illiterate respondents thought 
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democracy was “very good” in comparison to the overwhelming 81% of the most educated who 
felt the same way.  When looking at specific components, like freedom of speech for example, 
clear and strong trends emerge.   
 As respondent education increased, support for competition and disagreement among po-
litical groups did also.  For example, only 17% of the illiterate strongly agree that the competi-
tion and disagreement among political groups was a good thing whereas nearly 40% of those 
with a master’s degree or higher stated the same.  The trend line steadily increases as one be-
comes more educated, which confirms others work on the subject of intellect and education.   105
As people become more educated they were likely to view diversity in politics as a good thing 
for their country.    
 Contrary to Lebanese results, education did not play a factor in determining individual 
Moroccan respondents’ attitude towards democracy and rights associated with it (see Table 
18).   At every level of education from those who claimed illiteracy to those with a Master’s 106
degree or higher, support for democracy and the rights associated with it such as freedom of ex-
pression, was very high.  The expectation that education level would predict higher support for 
democracy in both Lebanon and Morocco; and therefore higher support for freedom of speech, 
was not supported by the data analyzed for this work.    107
 After reviewing and analyzing relationships between demographics and democratic 
rights, while limited, there were some compelling differences and similarities between the two 
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countries.  While demography helps predict some relationships, in general, respondents from 
both nations are quite supportive of democracy, yet when asked in specifics, those with more ed-
ucation tended to be more supportive, especially in Lebanon.  In addition, gender did seem to 
play a role, specifically in Lebanon.  While nothing groundbreaking, it is a confirmation that 
multiple factors influence individual level views of freedom of speech.  
!
VII. Discussion 
 In this section I will explore several of the key relationships analyzed in the previous sec-
tion, and the potential causes for a number of relationships analyzed.  My hope is that in contex-
tualizing these relationships, we can obtain a better understanding of the results presented above.  
This work sought to determine what role religion plays in relation to freedom of speech.  The 
data revealed important conclusions, adding value to the conversation and research on the 
MENA, democracy, civil rights and the Arab Spring.  This section will discuss several key find-
ings in the understanding of what affects individual attitudes towards freedom of expression. 
Morocco 
 According to the descriptive data, Morocco is a highly religious nation, almost exclusive-
ly Islamic.  The King, even in the constitution, has remained a sacred and inviolable individual, 
an arbiter above politics, and a direct representative of God.   All of this is symbolically repre108 -
sented in an annual ceremony during which subjects pledge their allegiance to him.   Findings 109
in this work suggest that being religious does not negatively affect attitudes towards freedom of 
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speech as modernization literature posits.   Another important relationship was found between 110
authoritarianism and freedom to criticize the government.  Individuals with authoritarian values 
were more likely to feel comfortable criticizing the Moroccan government.  While this may seem 
counter intuitive, situating the results in the broader context of Moroccan politics can help shed 
light on why those respondents who are most religious and hold authoritarian attitudes are more 
likely to feel free to criticize the government.   
 It may be that religious individuals relate to the state differently.  In Morocco, depending 
on their willingness to acknowledge the regime’s accepted interpretation of religions, those who 
claim to be religious are likely to be more comfortable in society.   In contrast, the less reli111 -
gious or the unreligious are less free, because their criticism may take a different form, as they do 
not relate to the King in the same way a religious individual might.  Religiosity predicts comfort 
with expression concerning government, potentially only when individual practice of religion is 
in agreement with the government’s interpretation.     
 Support for leaders open to ideological diversity is important to the religious and the non-
religious in Moroccan society, where 91% of all Moroccans think openness to diverse political 
ideas is important or very important.  There is a 13% difference between the religious and non-
religious when it comes to respondents who believe openness to diverse political opinion is “very 
important.”  In this case, the religious are significantly more likely by number and percentage 
than their less religious counterparts, to believe this to be important.  This is compelling for two 
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reasons.  The first is that while the Moroccan government is comfortable with censorship, it is 
not necessarily representing the will of the people.  According to the survey, Moroccans are far 
more open to diverse opinions than their government allows.  Secondly, it shows that religious 
individuals, Muslims in this instance, are open to new ideas, if the elected leaders they desire, 
should possess that as a quality.   112
 Non-authoritarians were less likely to support disagreement and competition among polit-
ical groups, a seemingly contradictory result to previously cited research.   It may be that a 113
more open environment for political debate might create a speech context in Morocco that would 
lead to political leaders less open to the views and opinion non-authoritarians hold.  There is also 
the potential that prior to the elections and the crafting of a new constitution in 2011, religious 
party influence in government may increase, ensuring a more unfriendly environment towards 
their less religious and sometimes non-authoritarian neighbors. 
 In Morocco the majority of respondents did not feel free to criticize the government, 
which may come as result of the prevalence of censorship in the country.   While the majority 114
of Moroccans hold the view that they are not free to criticize their government, those who are the 
least likely to agree with the government, non-authoritarians, are also least likely to feel comfort-
able criticizing their government.  As the number of laws relating to censorship of individuals 
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critical of the regime attest, publicly expressing views opposing the King or his policies results in 
heavy-handed censorship or worse.  115
 Moroccan respondents were supportive of rights suppression in general, but authoritarian 
respondents were much more so.  Since authoritarians defer to authority, anything that would 
cause instability to that authority’s rule, like an open critique of the regime, would be unpopular 
with these individuals.   Consequently, those respondents who were the most authoritarian, 116
would feel that censorship could be justified in this instance.  While commonly held assumptions 
are that authoritarians hold anti-freedom of speech attitudes, on the surface, some inconsistencies 
emerged.  This was represented in the overwhelming support for both diversity in political opin-
ions from both non-authoritarians and authoritarians.   Moroccans support authoritarian style 117
leadership.  They defer to government for stability and security reasons, but are very supportive 
of leaders who are open to diverse opinions.  These contradictions might be reconciled with the 
aforementioned role of the King, a king who possesses relative popularity through a well-crafted 
populist image.   The significant cultural power held by the king is a tool used to benefit his 118
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regime, which allows him control over the Moroccan government and society, while remaining 
an unelected leader.  119
 If the government is not accountable to its citizens, and non-authoritarians are less likely 
to support that government, then it follows that their knowledge of democratic failures in the past 
might shape their relationship to further democratization processes.   Consequently, negative 120
attitudes they possess towards the value of freedom of speech could be correlated to failures of 
the past as it relates to the continued strength of the Monarchy.  Understanding that there is a re-
lationship between peoples’ attitudes towards democracy and essential elements of democracy, 
like freedom of speech, and their country context ensures that the nuanced, but still imperfect 
knowledge of Morocco can be ascertained.  Even if all Moroccans thought democracy was the 
only system for Morocco, their definitions of what that looks like and what rights accompany 
that form of government may vary widely. 
Lebanon 
  As the data revealed, the Lebanese have a relatively positive outlook and support for de-
mocrat rights.  This includes civil rights like freedom of speech, which is measured by their 
openness to diverse political opinions.  Even though the Lebanese system of government is high-
ly religious, religion did not play the role that might be expected.   The findings from this 121
analysis show that there was no relationship to support for diverse political ideas and religiosity.  
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 Like Tessler (2002 and 2010), Jamal and Tessler (2008), Canetti-Nisim (2004) and Daph-
na Canetti-Nisim and Benjamin Beit-Hallahmi (2007) religiosity does not appear to be a barrier 
to freedom of speech nor comfort with expression in Lebanon.  Since religious identity plays a 
central role in how the Lebanese relate to their government and society, religious individuals 
may feel they are at higher liberty to express their views.  It seems that precisely because 
Lebanon has linked political power to religious sects, the religious are more comfortable to speak 
out against government.  
 Lebanese citizens possess highly non-authoritarian traits.  They are overwhelmingly an-
tagonistic towards rights suppression.  However, they do not hold overly positive views of 
democracy for their nation, especially when one possess non-authoritarian traits.  This illustrates 
a society in struggle with its ideals in practice.  In theory, they do not want authoritarian rule with 
its tools of suppression, but know that their democracy struggles, because of  systemic problems 
that some suggest foster injustice.   122
 Those who are authoritarian, who may even disagree with government policy, are more 
supportive of government and feel free to criticize it.  Furthermore, authoritarians are more likely 
to agree in general with authorities, hence their claim to be more free to criticize government.   123
Their comfort in criticizing may come as a result of the fact that they would have less to criticize, 
leading to less negative interactions with government and less possibility for government censor-
ship of their view.  If the past history of censorship is an indication of Arab Barometer Wave I 
responses, it is safe to say that those most critical of the president, judges, individuals associated 
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with these figures and any of the potentially “protected” government class, then these practices 
will continue.   124
 Lebanese respondents were extremely supportive of diversity in opinion and disagree-
ment among political groups as characteristics of their leaders.  Disagreement seems to be an im-
portant and essential component of a healthy free speech context.  Non-authoritarian respondents 
were noticeably less supportive when it came to the views with regards to ideological diversity in 
their political leaders.  This might be explained within the context of the confessional system.  As 
evidenced by Canetti-Nisim (2004), Lambe (2004) and Canetti-Nisim and Beit-Hallahmi’s 
(2007) research, authoritarians are more likely to possess negative attitudes towards diversity, 
and therefore, the converse could naturally be assumed about non-authoritarians.  In a confes-
sional system, government representatives are part of one’s “tribe.”  If a leader of this group 
breaks ideological ranks, then one becomes less supportive of that leader.  Consequently, ideo-
logical diversity may be discouraged.  Because of the confessional system, one’s identified reli-
gious group is an important asset, and attacking that asset weakens one of your strengths, com-
promising you and your group’s place in society. Which, leads to inherent contradictions in rela-
tionships to freedom of speech and other important elements of democracy.    
 Lebanese responses to questions concerning democracy show far more support for the 
system in theory than in practice.  While the Lebanese are decidedly pro-democracy and strongly 
opposed to authoritarian rule, the same cannot be said of their views when it comes to their own 
nation’s system of democracy.  The authoritarians, as one might expect, were quite supportive of 
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their system no matter its weaknesses.   However, those who are non-authoritarian were less so. 125
They were more likely to disagree with their leaders and system of government, something con-
firmed by their dissatisfaction with their system of governance.  Since all of the Lebanese are 
decidedly anti-authoritarian and pro-democracy, it would suggest that they want democracy.  
!
VII. CONCLUSION !
 What impact does religion have on freedom of speech in countries such as Morocco and 
Lebanon?  Does religious practice in Morocco and Lebanon suppress this freedom?  The simple 
answer to the latter question is no, the data does not show religious individuals possessing anti-
freedom of speech attitudes nor do they want to necessarily censor others.  For example, in 
Lebanon, there was no statistical relationship between religiosity and freedom of expression, also 
suggesting that religion is not correlated with a desire for rights suppression.  The socio-political 
context of Lebanon, which encourages public displays of religious expression, supports this con-
clusion.   
 Religion did not negatively relate to freedom of speech specifically.  While religion may 
impact individual Moroccan and Lebanese in other contexts of analysis, it did not predict a nega-
tive relationship to freedom of expression.  So how might these results help in understanding 
events such as the responses to both the Muhammad cartoons and the Innocence of Muslims 
movie trailer?  In addition, how might it help analysis and interpretation of the religion in the 
MENA going forward?  
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 First, applying results from two specific groups of respondents to respondents from other 
parts of the world presents significant problems, as has been noted throughout this work.  So at-
tempting to apply a conclusion from a significant and reliable set of data, requires a level of care.  
Just as importantly, it requires that the context of every site of analysis be weighed and consid-
ered.  In addition to this caution, assuming that all those who were outraged over events such as 
the Muhammad cartoons, were so only because they were religious and Muslims presents anoth-
er set of issues.  While it may be true that many protesters were both religious and Muslim, gen-
eralizing the cause of outrage to be a result of them being religious and Muslim does not always 
align with the available data.  Even if one assumed they were all religious Muslims, this work 
showed that religious Muslims are not inherently opposed to free expression.  This leads one to 
conclude that opposition to the cartoons was not solely caused by the religiosity of the individ-
ual, and going forward, incidents involving Muslims need not only be analyzed within a religious 
context. 
 Theses complexities are better understood through an expansion of the research.  Islam is 
understood to be compatible with democracy.  A Muslim’s interpretation of his or her faith readi-
ly blends with democracy in practice.  The democratic evolution and maturation in the MENA 
has demanded a deeper understanding of individual level attitudes in the finer points of democra-
cy.  Operating under the assumption that having elections and crafting constitutions will make a 
people free and able to live in a representative democracy, constructs a limited view of a society.  
Morocco is a society which conducts elections and possesses a newly crafted constitution, and 
yet wide-spread censorship continues.   
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 This analysis of the Arab Barometer Wave I has brought valuable insight to literature ex-
amining democratization in the region.  The recent Arab political uprisings come as a result of 
much change, and data reflects this change; Muslims in Morocco and Lebanon view democracy 
and freedom of expression positively.  The importance of these findings cannot be minimized.  It 
suggests that popular outrage over a number of religiously charged images does not necessarily 
have to be viewed in only one context: Islam versus Democracy and Muslims against freedom of 
speech.  Rather a more nuanced understanding is required, one which acknowledges that a Mus-
lims’ attitudes toward freedom of expression is not solely motivated by his or her religious be-
liefs.  In addition, as numerous MENA nations continue to wrestle with ideas and concepts asso-
ciated with fledgling democratic processes, conclusions from Morocco and Lebanon can help 
inform analysis regarding the region.  Like Morocco and Lebanon, these almost exclusively 
Muslim societies do not need only to be viewed by their religious practice, when it concerns 
democracy and rights associated with them.  As a way of not overgeneralizing the results of this 
research, it is important to note that while Moroccan and Lebanese attitudes towards freedom of 
speech is not a function of their religiosity, one might find this to be true in other countries.  
Again, the importance of this relates to the fact that Muslims need not always be viewed as pos-
sessing negative attitudes towards democracy and more specifically freedom of speech.  Conse-
quently, what the future holds for countries in the MENA as it relates to democracy will be as 
varied as the people that make them up.    
 If people of countries like Morocco and Lebanon are getting the government they de-
serve, then why do they hold attitudes toward freedom of speech that are not in line with the lev-
els of censorship used by their governments?  This subject is so complex, and it seems any num-
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ber of issues could be the cause for this inconsistency.  Strong individual level support has not 
always resulted in a free and open press, or a context for other forms of speech and expression.  
Nations made up of people who are supportive of democracy and freedom of expression, proba-
bly will not remain censored forever.  Finally, religion is not a predictor for anti-freedom of 
speech attitudes.  Arguments being made to the contrary are assumptions not consistent with the 
available data. 
!
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TABLE 1—— Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent’s Views in Comfort in           
            Criticizing Government in Morocco
Respondent Feels Free to 
Criticize their 
Government
Pray 
(Yes)
Pray 
(No
Total
Strongly Agree 15.43 
(152)
5.88 
(12)
13.79 
(164)
Somewhat Agree 24.87 
(246)
22.55 
(46)
24.56 
(292)
Somewhat Disagree 36.14 
(356)
39.22 
(80)
36.67 
(436)
Strongly Disagree 23.45 
(231)
32.35 
(66)
24.98 
(297)
Total 100.00 
(985)
100.00 
(204)
100.00 
(1,189)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 17.3732 Pr = 0.001
TABLE 2—— Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent’s Views in Comfort in           
            Criticizing Government in Lebanon
Respondent Feels Free to 
Criticize their 
Government
Pray 
(Yes)
Pray 
(No
Total
Strongly Agree 46.14 
(466)
41.18 
(70)
45.42 
(536)
Somewhat Agree 41.58 
(420)
50.00 
(85)
42.80 
(505)
Somewhat Disagree 8.02 
(81)
5.88 
(10)
7.71 
(91)
Strongly Disagree 4.26 
(43)
2.94 
(5)
4.07 
(48)
Total 100.00 
(1,010)
100.00 
(170)
100.00 
(1,189)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 4.6786 Pr = 0.197
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TABLE 3—— Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent’s Views on Factors that Make a  
            Leader Qualified for Political Office in Morocco
Importance of Openness 
to Diverse Political Ideas 
as Qualification for 
Political Offices
Pray 
(Yes)
Pray 
(No
Total
Very Important 62.80 
(633)
48.86 
(107)
60.31 
(740)
Important 28.87 
(291)
37.44 
(82)
30.40 
(373)
Somewhat Unimportant 4.96 
(50)
9.59 
(21)
5.79 
(71)
Not Important at All 3.37 
(34)
4.11 
(9)
3.50 
(43)
Total 100.00 
(1,008)
100.00 
(219)
100.00 
(1,185)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 17.0868 Pr = 0.001
TABLE 4—— Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent’s Views on Factors that Make a  
            Leader Qualified for Political Office in Lebanon
Importance of Openness 
to Diverse Political Ideas 
as Qualification for 
Political Offices
Pray 
(Yes)
Pray 
(No
Total
Very Important 77.10 
(781)
80.23 
(138)
77.55 
(919)
Important 211 
(20.83)
19.19 
(33)
20.59 
(244)
Somewhat Unimportant 1.58 
(16)
0.00 
(0)
1.35 
(16)
Not Important at All 0.49 
(5)
0.58 
(1)
0.51 
(6)
Total 100.00 
(1,013)
100.00 
(172)
100.00 
(1,185)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 3.1182 Pr = 0.374
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TABLE 5—— Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent’s Views on Comfort with Justification for 
            Rights Suppression in the Morocco
To What Degree Would 
You Agree that the 
Violation of Human rights 
Was Justified in the Name 
of Security and Stability?
Pray 
(Yes)
Pray 
(No
Total
Completely Justified 39.73 
(408)
45.91 
(101)
40.82 
(509)
Justified 26.78 
275
24.09 
(53)
26.30 
(328)
Not Very Justified 11.78 
121
12.27 
(27)
11.87 
(148)
Not Justifiable at All 21.71 
(223)
17.73 
(39)
21.01 
(262)
Total 100.00 
(1,027)
100.00 
(220)
100.00 
(1,247)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 3.6005 Pr = 0.308
TABLE 6—— Proportion of Religious/Non-Religious Respondent’s Views on Comfort with Justification for 
            Rights Suppression in the Lebanon
To What Degree Would 
You Agree that the 
Violation of Human rights 
Was Justified in the Name 
of Security and Stability?
Pray 
(Yes)
Pray 
(No
Total
Completely Justified 4.29 
(42)
4.07 
(7)
4.26 
(49)
Justified 11.54 
(113)
6.98 
(12)
10.86 
(125)
Not Very Justified 10.32 
(101)
7.56 
(13)
9.90 
(114)
Not Justifiable at All 73.85 
(723)
81.40 
(140)
74.98 
(863)
Total 100.00 
(979)
100.00 
(172)
100.0 
(1,151)
Pearson Chi 2(3) = 5.0593 Pr = 0.168
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TABLE 7——Frequency and Proportion of Moroccans Who Are Authoritarian/Non-Authoritarian Preferences 
           for Disagreement and Competition Among Political Groups in Morocco
Agreement with 
Competiion and 
Diversity Among 
Political Groups
Strongly Au-
thoritarian
Authoritarian Non-Authori-
tarian
Strongly Non-
Authoritarian 
Total 
Strongly Agree 47.23 
(162)
42.02 
(137)
37.70 
(72)
42.23 
(87)
42.96 
(458)
Somewhat Agree 36.73 
(126)
37.12 
(121)
36.13 
(69)
27.67 
(57)
34.99 
373
Somewhat Dis-
agree
9.33 
(32)
12.88 
(42)
16.75 
(32)
14.56 
(30)
12.76 
(136)
Strongly Disagree 6.71 
(23)
7.98 
(26)
9.42 
(18)
15.53 
(32)
9.29 
99
Total 100.00 
(343)
100.00 
(326)
100.00 
(191)
100.00 
(206)
100.00 
1,066
Pearson Chi 2(9) = 
24.5301
Pr = 0.004
TABLE 8——Frequency and Proportion of Lebanese Who Are Authoritarian/Non-Authoritarian Preferences 
           for Disagreement and Competition Among Political Groups in Lebanon
Agreement with 
Competition and 
Diversity Among 
Political Groups
Strongly Au-
thoritarian
Authoritarian Non-Authori-
tarian
Strongly Non-
Authoritarian 
Total
Strongly Agree 45.10 
(46)
38.60 
(83)
22.53 
(82)
33.78 
(152)
32.10 
363
Somewhat Agree 17.65 
(18)
35.35 
(76)
42.86 
(156)
28.89 
(130)
33.60 
(380)
Somewhat Disagree 15.69 
(16)
12.09 
(26)
21.43 
(78)
11.56 
(52)
15.21 
172
Strongly Disagree 21.57 
(22)
13.95 
(30)
13.19 
(48)
25.78 
(116)
19.81 
(224)
Total 100.00 
(102)
100.00 
(215)
100.00 
(364)
100.00 
(450)
100.00 
(1,131)
Pearson Chi2(9) = 
74.2439
Pr = 0.000
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TABLE 9—
            and Freedom/Comfort to Criticize Their Government
Freedom to Crit-
icize Government
Strongly Au-
thoritarian
Authoritarian Non-Authori-
tarian
Strongly Non-
Authoritarian 
Total
Strongly Agree 15.01 
(53)
12.24 
(42)
10.43 
(22)
20.27 
(45)
42.96 
(162)
Somewhat Agree 29.46 
(104)
28.57 
(98)
20.85 
(44)
15.77 
(35)
34.99 
(281)
Somewhat Dis-
agree
32.01 
(113)
38.78 
(133)
49.76 
(105)
24.32 
(54)
12.76 
(405)
Strongly Disagree 23.51 
(83)
20.41 
(70)
18.96 
(40)
39.64 
(88)
9.29 
(281)
Total 100.00 
(353)
100.00 
(343)
100.00 
(211)
100.00 
(222)
100.00 
(1,129)
Pearson Chi 2(9) = 
69.7940
Pr = 0.000
TABLE 10—
              Preferences and Freedom/Comfort to Criticize their Government
Freedom to Crit-
icize Government
Strongly Au-
thoritarian
Authoritarian Non-Authori-
tarian
Strongly Non-
Authoritarian 
Total
Strongly Agree 69.61 
(71)
46.73 
(100)
28.46 
(105)
54.42 
(246)
42.96 
(522)
Somewhat Agree 20.59 
(21)
43.93 
(94)
61.52 
(227)
31.19 
(141)
34.99 
(483)
Somewhat Dis-
agree
5.88 
(6)
6.54 
(14)
7.86 
(29)
8.41 
(38)
12.76 
(87)
Strongly Disagree 3.92 
(4)
2.80 
(6)
2.17 
(8)
5.97 
(27)
9.29 
(45)
Total 100.00 
(102)
100.00 
(214)
100.00 
(369)
100.00 
(452)
100.00 
(1,137)
Pearson Chi 2(9) = 
110.2460
Pr = 0.000
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FIGURE 1—Frequency and Proportion of Moroccans and Lebanese Who Have  
         Authoritarian/Non-Authoritarian Preferences and Their Attitudes Towards the  
         Justifiability of the Violation of Human Rights in the Name of Security and Stability
0
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TABLE 11——Degree by Which Authoritarian/Non-Authoritarians are Open to Diverse Opinions is an  
             Important Qualification for Political Office in 
Openness to Diverse Po-
litical Ideas
Strongly Au-
thoritarian
Authoritarian Non-Au-
thoritarian
Strongly Non-
Authoritarian
Total
Very Important 65.23 
(242)
67.71 
(237)
50.45 
(112)
57.27 
(126)
61.65 
(717)
Important 30.19 
(112)
26.86 
(94)
44.14 
(98)
23.18 
(51)
30.52 
(355)
Unimportant 3.77 
(14)
4.29 
(15)
3.60 
(8)
10.00 
(22)
5.07 
(59)
Not Important at All 0.81 
(3)
1.14 
(4)
1.80 
(4)
9.55 
(21)
2.75 
(32)
Total 100.00 
(371)
100.00 
(350)
100.00 
(222)
100.00 
(220)
100.00 
(1,163)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 5.0593 Pr = 0.000
TABLE 12——
             Important Qualification for Political Office in 
Openness to Diverse Polit-
ical Ideas
Strongly Au-
thoritarian
Authoritarian Non-Au-
thoritarian
Strongly Non-
Authoritarian
Total
Very Important 83.50 
(86)
81.02 
(175)
69.73 
(258)
81.19 
(367)
77.65 
(886)
Important 14.56 
(15)
18.98 
(41)
27.03 
(100)
17.48 
(79)
20.60 
(235)
Unimportant 1.94 
(2)
0.00 
(0)
2.16 
(8)
1.11 
(5)
1.31 
(15)
Not Important at All 0.00 
(0)
0.00 
(0)
1.08 
(4)
0.22 
(1)
0.44 
(5)
Total 100.00 
(103)
100.00 
(216)
100.00 
(370)
100.00 
(452)
100.00 
(1,141)
Person Chi2(9) = 26.8381 Pr = 0.001
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TABLE 13——Frequency and Proportion of Moroccans who are Male and Female Views on Disagreement and 
             Competition Among Political Groups in 
How much do you agree 
or disagree with the fol-
lowing statements? Com-
petition among Political 
Groups is not a bad thing 
for our country
Male Female Total
Strongly Agree 47.13 
(255)
39.22 
(222)
43.09 
(477)
Agree 30.50 
(165)
37.63 
(213)
34.15 
(378)
Somewhat Disagree 11.65 
(63)
14.13 
(80)
12.92 
(143)
Strongly Disagree 10.72 
(58)
9.01 
(51)
9.85 
(109)
Total 100.00 
(541)
100.00 
(566)
100.00 
(1,107)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 10.2894 Pr = 0.016
TABLE 14——Frequency and Proportion of 
             system of Governance for 
Male Female Total
Very Good 68.47 
(469)
67.00 
(335)
67.85 
(804)
Good 24.38 
(167)
26.60 
(133)
25.32 
(300)
Bad 4.96 
(34)
4.80 
(24)
4.89 
(58)
Very Bad 2.19 
(15)
1.60 
(8)
1.94 
(23)
Total 100.00 
(685)
100.00 
(500)
100.00 
(1,185)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 1.1883 Pr = 0.756
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TABLE 15——Frequency and Proportion of 
             System of Governance for 
Male Female Total
Very Good 70.40 
(402)
64.79 
(403)
67.48 
(805)
Good 24.69 
(141)
31.83 
(198)
28.42 
(339)
Bad 2.45 
(14)
2.57 
(16)
2.51 
(30)
Very Bad 2.45 
(14)
0.80 
(5)
1.59 
(19)
Total 100.00 
(571)
100.00 
(622)
100.00 
(1,193)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 11.8232 Pr = 0.008
TABLE 16——Frequency and Proportion of Lebanese Who Are Male and Female Views on Disagreement and 
             Competition Among Political Groups in 
How much do you agree 
or disagree with the fol-
lowing statements? Com-
petition among Political 
Groups is not a bad thing 
for our country
Male Female Total
Strongly Agree 36.73 
(249)
25.67 
(127)
32.11 
(376)
Agree 33.48 
(227)
33.47 
(165)
33.48 
(392)
Somewhat Disagree 13.42 
(91)
17.65 
(87)
15.20 
(178)
Strongly Disagree 16.37 
(111)
23.12 
(114)
19.21 
(225)
Total 100.00 
(678)
100.00 
(493)
100.00 
(1,171)
Pearson Chi2(3) = 20.8134 Pr = 0.000
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TABLE 17——Frequency and Proportion of 
             Governance for 
Democracy 
as System of 
Governance
Illiterate Elementary 
Education
Primary 
Educa-
tion
Secondary 
Education
College 
Degree
BA MA or 
Higher
Total
Very Good 64.00 
(16)
70.21 
(66)
55.36 
(160)
66.55 
(187)
74.52 
(79)
75.35 
(266)
81.08 
(30)
67.85 
(804)
Good 32.00 
(8)
20.21 
19
32.18 
(93)
27.40 
(77)
16.98 
(18)
22.66 
(80)
13.51 
(5)
25.32 
(300)
Bad 4.00 
(1)
7.45 
(7)
8.30 
(24)
4.63 
(13)
6.60 
(7)
1.42 
(5)
2.70 
(1)
4.89 
(58)
Very Bad 0.00 
(0)
2.13 
(2)
4.15 
(12)
1.42 
(4)
1.89 
(2)
0.57 
(2)
2.70 
(1)
1.94 
(23)
Total 100.00 
(25)
100.00 
(94)
100.00 
(289)
100.00 
(281)
100.00 
(106)
100.00 
(353)
100.00 
(37)
100.00 
(1,185)
Person 
Chi2(18) = 
54.2580
Pr = 0.000
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TABLE 18——Frequency and Proportion of 
             Governance for 
Democracy 
as System of 
Gover-
ernance
Illiterate Elementary 
Education
Primary 
Educa-
tion
Secondary 
Education
College 
Degree
BA MA or 
Highe
r
Total
Very Good 70.02 
(327)
66.78 
(197)
64.18 
(129)
64.76 
(68)
70.59 
(12)
58.82 
(20)
70.27 
(52)
67.48 
(805)
Good 25.05 
(117)
29.83 
(88)
31.34 
63
33.33 
(35)
29.41 
(5)
38.24 
(13)
24.32 
(18)
28.42 
(339)
Bad 3.00 
(14)
1.36 
(4)
2.99 
(6)
1.90 
(2)
0.00 
(0)
2.94 
(1)
4.05 
(3)
2.51 
(30)
Very Bad 1.93 
(9)
2.03 
(6)
1.49 
(3)
0.00 
(0)
0.00 
(0)
0.00 
(0)
1.35 
(1)
1.59 
(19)
Total 100.00 
(467)
100.00 
(295)
100.00 
(201)
100.00 
(105)
100.00 
(17)
100.00 
(34)
100.00 
(74)
100.00 
(1,193)
Person 
Chi2(18) = 
13.2597
Pr = 0.776
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